Judicial Independence by Hood, Joseph M.
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 23 | Issue 1 Article 5
3-15-2003
Judicial Independence
Joseph M. Hood
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Judges Commons
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph M. Hood, Judicial Independence, 23 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judges. (2003)
available at http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol23/iss1/5
Judicial Independence
By Hon. Joseph M. Hood*
First of all, I would like to thank you for the invitation to speak to
you today. It is an honor to be here. No doubt I was selected not for
my wisdom but for my brevity, and I shall try today to live up to that
expectation.
I have been asked to speak on the subject of "judicial
independence," a subject on which I am far from expert. In a way, I
believe, no one is (at least if you accept my definition of the term,
which I will provide momentarily). But while far from expert, I have
over my twelve (12) years on the bench-and many more before that
as a federal magistrate judge-come to learn something about this
nebulous concept, this so-called judicial independence, and it is that
which I have learned that I shall share with you today.
Judicial independence. The term seems elastic and mysterious,
and in many ways it escapes definition. For my purposes this is
problematic, for it would seem that you cannot discuss something
without first defining it. So, as an initial matter, I will attempt to do
exactly that: define judicial independence.
Now, when I first started thinking about this speech I pondered
the question for quite some time-unsuccessfully. I just could not
come up with a succinct, meaningful definition. And so, I did what I
always do when I cannot come up with an answer: I punted. I had
my law clerk review the literature, 1 and he came up with the
following definition, as set forth by the American Judicature Society
World-Wide Web site:.
* Hon. Joseph M. Hood, District Judge, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, Address at the National Association of
Administrative Law Judges Annual Convention (Oct. 21, 2002).
1. The author would like to thank his law clerk, Benjamin Gerald Dusing,
University of Kentucky, J.D., 2001, for his research and assistance in writing this
speech.
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Judicial independence is a concept that expresses the
ideal state of the judicial branch of government. The
concept encompasses the idea that individual judges
and the judicial branch as a whole should work free of
ideological influence. Scholars have broken down the
general idea of judicial independence into two distinct
concepts: decisional independence and institutional, or
branch, independence. Decisional independence
refers to a judge's ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on the
individual facts and applicable law. Institutional
independence describes the separation of the judicial
branch from the executive and legislative branches of
government.2
This is the best definition I could find; one that, I think, gets as
close to the meaning of the principle as is possible.
This definition lends a semblance of structure to my talk, and I
shall proceed by assessing its parts. But first, I would like to make a
general point about the definition as a whole.
That point is this: the American Judicature Society, in defining
judicial independence as "an ideal state," is on to something.
Judicial independence, I have come to learn, is not the natural
state-it is rather, a goal, something for which we should strive. And
I like the definition in that it recognizes this reality. The truth is this:
both federal and state constitutional structures establish judicial
branches that are not naturally "independent"-at least, not in the
strictest sense of that term. In the federal system, for example, the
judicial branch is linked to the executive and legislative branches-
from a judicial appointment perspective, through nomination and
confirmation, respectively. In the state system-at least in those
states that democratically elect their judges (an overwhelming
majority)-the composition of the judiciary is linked directly, at least
in theory, to the popular will. So, I reiterate: our American
judiciaries, structurally, are not by nature "independent."
Independence is a goal for which we must strive.
2. American Judicature Society, What is Judicial Independence? (Nov. 27,
2002), at http://www.ajs.org/cji/cji-whatisji.asp (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).
Returning to the definition provided by the American Judicature
Society, I would like to talk for a moment about the notion of
"decisional independence." Decisional independence, you will
recall, refers to a judge's "ability to render decisions free from
political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and
applicable law."
3
Now, it seems to me that the concept of decisional independence
is most relevant in the context of state judicial systems like
Kentucky's, where judges are elected. In such systems, structural
independence is less of an issue-unlike the federal system, for
instance, there is no executive nomination or legislative confirmation.
No, for states in which judges are elected by popular vote, threats to
judicial independence generally rear their ugly heads at the decisional
level.
And this is no secret. I do not have to tell you that there is a
growing concern, if not about the fact that judges are elected, then
about how they are elected, and how the manner in which they are
elected can come to bear on individual decisions. The problem, at
least as I see it, is this: popularly-elected judges require elections,
which require money, which requires contributions, which must
come from contributors. Contributors that can-and, in fact, do-
have occasion to appear before the very judges whom they helped to
elect. Now, it cannot be denied that, whether these judges are biased
or not (and, I must add, my experience has been that they are not),
the mere prospect of a conflict-of-interest can create an impression of
impropriety. This, of course, is unacceptable, for it goes without
saying that it is just as important to maintain the appearance of
judicial neutrality as it is the reality.4 After all, justice that appears
unjust is really no justice at all.
Threats to the decisional independence of elected judiciaries are
manifested in many forms, not the least significant of which is the
spiraling cost of judicial campaigns. 5 It is enough to say that,
increasingly, such races have come to look much like those for
legislative or executive positions. I do not purport to know the
3. 1d.
4. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
5. Richard Beliles, Change Financing of Judicial Campaigns, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Sept. 9, 2002, at A9.
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answers to the emergence of such problems; I can only lend my voice
to those who decry the trend. I will say this, however: money and
special interest groups have come to play too great a role. The
current system cries out for reform.
Along these lines, permit me a momentary tangent to say a few
words about a recent United States Supreme Court decision that
touches, if only indirectly, upon this subject of decisional
independence. I predict that the case, Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White,6 shall have a tremendous affect upon the way in which
judges are elected in the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and indeed,
nationwide.
In White, a divided Supreme Court held that so-called
"announce" clauses, provisions in state judicial conduct canons
prohibiting candidates for judicial office (incumbents included) from
"announcing his or her views on disputed legal or political issues,"
are unconstitutional. 7 The Court, by a 5-4 margin with Justice Scalia
writing for the majority, found that such clauses are inconsistent with
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 8 The Court
declined to rule, as would have the Court's dissenting justices, that
judicial elections are fundamentally different from legislative
elections and that, therefore, the former could be regulated to a
greater extent.9
Now, I will leave the debate over the soundness of the White
opinion to legal scholars and the like, and I will not pass judgment as
to the Court's conclusion. But, I would like to underscore the
decision's significance, particularly as it relates to questions of
decisional independence. The case, it would seem, makes the
following very clear: while a judicial candidate must stop short of
"pledging" or "promising" to rule in a certain manner in a certain
case, statements expressing opinions on the wisdom of past decisions
or expressing viewpoints on political views are perfectly
permissible.10  The decision demarcates the constitutional outer
bounds of how states may go about attempting to de-politicize
6. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
7. Id. at 768.
8. Id. at 788.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 780-81.
judicial contests. 1 It makes clear, as we pursue the path of reform,
what we cannot do.
Given that most states have sought to ensure the decisional
independence of their elected judges by regulating campaign-related
judicial speech, the White decision effectively sends states back to
the drawing board. The question thus arises: if we cannot ensure the
decisional independence of our elected judges by regulating judicial
speech, how can we do it? I am of the opinion that this question
requires us to reexamine a more fundamental question, a question
that goes to the heart of the very manner by which we determine the
composition of state judiciaries.
In this respect, I would like to cite the concurring opinion of
Justice O'Connor in White. 12 While agreeing with the majority that
so-called "announce clauses" cannot withstand strict scrutiny under
the First Amendment, Justice O'Conner expressed great concern
about the popular pressures working to affect the impartiality-or, in
the parlance of the American Judicature Society, the decisional
independence-of elected judges.' 3  In White, Justice O'Connor
stated flatly and at the outset that, while she joined the opinion of the
Court, she "wr[ote] separately to express [her] concerns about
judicial elections generally." 14 She added that: "even aside from
what judicial candidates may say while campaigning, the very
practice of electing judges undermines this interest."' 15
We of course want judges to be impartial, in the sense of being
free from any personal stake in the outcome of the cases to which
they are assigned. But if judges are subject to regular elections they
are likely to feel that they have at least some personal stake in the
outcome of every publicized case. "Elected judges cannot help being
aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a
particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects."' 6
11. Id. at 782-83.
12. Id. at 788-92 (O,Connor, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 788.
15. Id.
16. Id. (citing Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter
Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 739
(1994)).
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Now, I would like to say that I find Justice O'Connor's
concurrence particularly instructive, for she speaks from experience.
Unlike the other eight members of the present Court, Justice
O'Connor herself at one time served as an elected judge (on the
appellate bench in Arizona).
Before I conclude my remarks about decisional independence-
and turn to the related question of "structural independence"-I
would like to make this clear: I am not calling for the abolishment of
the practice of popularly electing judges in favor of a system of
appointment. I am calling for a renewed debate on the question how
best to ensure decisional independence. And I will add, I think that
this debate should consider all potential angles-including
consideration of any potential benefits of appointment over election.
Thus far I have spoken to the issue of decisional independence,
an issue of greatest relevance to those states, like Kentucky, that
select their judges through popular election. I would now like to say
a few things about structural independence-the American Judicature
Society's second element of judicial independence.
Structural independence comes into play in those systems-like
the federal government's-where judges are appointed. It is the
nomination and confirmation functions-the former, of course, the
privilege of the executive, the latter that of the Senate-that give rise
to the issue. Among the questions that arise are the following: What
is the scope of executive discretion in the nomination of candidates?
What should be considered "legitimate grounds" for Senatorial
rejection of such candidates? There are many others, of course, but I
think it is fair to say that all of the questions-and controversies-
surrounding the federal judicial selection process reduce to this
question: To what extent is it permissible for a President to nominate
or the Senate to reject a candidate on the basis of "judicial
philosophy?" Stated more bluntly, what is the proper role of judicial
perspective and viewpoint?
Of course, opinions abound. At the extremes, there are first those
who advocate what I call the "beauty pageant" approach. Such
people would completely discard a nominee's judicial ideology,
viewpoint, and perspective. Instead, the question of qualification
would go no further than consideration of a nominee's academic
pedigree, legal reputation, or scholarship. On the other end of the
spectrum are those who would place no limits on the role of ideology
and perspective. Such persons would give the President virtually
unfettered discretion in the nomination process, and would consider
the selection of federal judges to be more the province of the
executive, and less that of the Senate. "Advice and Consent" would
be abridged to simply "Consent."' 17
But, it seems to me, the proper approach is one that seeks the
middle ground. I will confess that this is not a novel-or even
revolutionary-opinion; but I do think that it is one worth repeating.
Article II of the United States Constitution makes very clear that
neither the executive nor the Senate is to have exclusive control over
the selection process; cooperation, it can be presumed, was
intended. 18 In this sense, it is just as improper for a President to
nominate an unabashed ideologue as it is for the Senate to reject an
otherwise qualified nominee for reasons strictly political.
On this subject of balance-and, for that matter, on the subject of
structural independence-I can only echo the comments of Judge Jon
0. Newman, Senior Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, who recently spoke to this issue in an article entitled
"Federal Judicial Selection." Addressing the selection process,
Judge Newman eschewed the "beauty pageant" approach by stating,
"[p]hilosophy matters, viewpoint matters, who we are matters. If it
did not, you would not need judges at all. You would have a
computer, you would put in the data, and it would spit out an
answer. ' 2° But, Judge Newman added, philosophy should not be the
only thing and there should be obvious limits to the role of
philosophy and viewpoint.2 1 "[T]he two branches need to ... come
more into balance, [and to] avoid the extremes .... Extremism on
the judiciary is ... inappropriate.' 22 It seems to me that, in a way,
Judge Newman is saying that in order to achieve structural
independence-and, by implication, judicial independence-we must
seek structural balance. We must recognize the legitimate and
proper roles of both the executive and the Senate in the selection
17. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
18. Id.
19. Jon 0. Newman, Federal Judicial Selection, 86 JUDICATURE 10(2002).
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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process, and avoid extremism at all costs.
Well, I have talked now for some time-longer than I promised, I
suppose-and I thank you for indulging me. I have enjoyed speaking
to you and, again, it is an honor to be here. I hope you have gotten
something out of my talk, something more than fifteen minutes of
sleep! If you have been napping, here is a summary: judicial
independence is not the natural state, but rather an ideal, one for
which we must strive. Judicial independence may be broken down
into two components: decisional and structural independence, both
being at once facets of and prerequisites for the larger principle.
Let me say one more thing before closing: Much has been
made-particularly in the wake of 9/11-of this country's
"greatness." And most often, it seems to me, we hear about this
wonderful principle known as "majority rule." It is often intimated
that it is this principle that makes this country great, that sets it apart
from the world's other nations.
I must respectfully disagree. It is true that majority rule is a
bedrock political principle of the United States and one that served to
fuel the fires of the revolution through which, over 200 years ago, we
threw off the oppressive yoke of old King George. But, still, as one
looks around the world, most countries have come to adopt some
variation of this principle; most have "seen the light" in some form or
another. In this sense, we are no longer exceptional: around the
globe, most majorities do, in fact, rule. And yet there remains a great
deal of oppression; at least, a great deal more than that which exists
in the United States.
No, I submit to you that it is not the "majority rule" principle that
stands as the backbone of our uniquely American liberties, but rather
something else: something that-with respect to majoritarianism-
does not empower, but rather limits; something that prevents majority
rule from becoming majority domination.
That "something," I submit to you, is judicial independence. In
my opinion, it is this that distinguishes our country, this that makes it
great. This is the foundation of our freedom. This is our protector.
This is what renders our rights unalienable. This-this elusive
notion of judicial independence.
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In my view, an independent judiciary is the greatest gift of our
forefathers. In the form of judicial independence, they bequeathed us
freedom.
Thank you.

